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APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN LIFE TENANT AND
REMAINDERMAN OF LOSS ON DEFAIULTED
MORTGAGE SECURITY HELD IN TRUST
By CarARLEs V SRIiLEY*
I. THE APPORTIONMENT RATIO
In cases m which mortgages on real estate are legal trust
investments1 and the trustee of a trust, in which one person is
entitled to the trust income and another to the corpus on the
happening of a designated event, forecloses a mortgage held as
a trust investment and realizes on the security at a loss to the
trust estate,2 the question of apportionment arises.3 The inten-
tion of the settlor if expressed in the trust instrument, or reason-
ably ascertainable from the circumstances surrounding its
execution, will control.4 In the absence of any direction by the
settlor a rule based upon some legal theory must be applied.5
The courts have laid down various rules of apportionment
which, for convenience of discussion, will be designated as
*LL.B., Umversity of Kentucky, 1942. Special Agent, F B. I.
'See 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) Sec. 227.7; Bailey and Rice, The
Duties of a Trustee with Respect to Defaulted Mortgage Investments
(1935, 1936) 84 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 157, 327, 625, at p. 157, note 1.
2 This paper does not deal with the situation where the realiza-
tion of a mortgage security results m a profit. For discussion of this
situation see Bailey and Rice, op. cit. supra note 1, at 167.
all the loss should, be equitably apportioned between the
innocent life tenant and the remainderrnan." In re Tuttle, 49 N. J.
Eq. (4 Dick.) 259, 24 AUt. 1, 2 (1892). "The equity of the life tenant
to receive the whole income during his tenancy is every whit as
great as that of the remainderman to have the corpus of the trust
remain unnpaired." In re Otis Will, 276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E. (2d)
556, 558 (1937). "Mr. Justice Cullen says, 'Why should the life ten-
ant fast for twenty-five years, that the remainderman may feast at
the end of that period? Why should each not have exactly his own
so far as it is possible to ascertain it?'" In re Marshall, 43 Misc.
238, 88 N. Y. Supp. 550, 552 (Sur. Ct. 1904) [quoting from Matter of
Rogers, 22 App. Div. 436, 48 N. Y. Supp. 173, 181 (Sup Ct., App.
Div. 1897)]. "It is well settled that where the interest upon mort-
gages is unpaid, and the premises are eventually sold, the sum re-
ceived should be ratably apportioned between principal and income."
Meldon v. Delvin, 31 App. Div. 146, 53 N. Y. Supp. 172, 180 (1898),
affd. 167 N. Y. 573, 60 N. E. 1116 (1901). The situation here is to
be distinguished from that involving unproductive real estate. See
znfra note 35.
"Matter of Chapal's Will, 269 N. Y. 464, 199 N. E. 762, 103 A. L. R.
1268 (1936), 4 BOGERT: TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) Sec. 820;
2 SCOTT, Op. cit. supra note 1, Sec. 227.7.
'Note (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 805,
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follows New York Rule The life tenant and the remainderman
share in the net proceeds, respectively, in the ratios of the ar-
rears of interest at the date of final realization and the unpaid
principal to the total of the unpaid interest and unpaid
principal.6
Restatement Rule The remainderman takes that part of
the net proceeds which, if invested at the tne of default, would,
with interest at the prevailing rate of earnings upon trust in-
vestments, equal the net proceeds at the time of realization. The
difference between the net proceeds and the principal thus
determined goes to the life tenant.7
' The rule is applied or recogmzed in one of its various forms in
Hudson County National Bank v. Woodruff, 122 N. J. Eq. 441, 194
Atl. 266 (1937), Equitable Trust Co. v. Swoboda, 113 N. J. Eq. 399,
167 Atl. 525 (1933), Trenton Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v Donnelly,
65 N. J. Eq. 119, 55 Atl. 92 (1903), In re Tuttle, 49 N. J. Eq. (4 Dick.)
259, 24 Ati. 1 (1892), Hagan v. Platt, 48 N. J. Eq. 206, 21 At. 860
(1891), In re Wilson's Estate, 167 Misc. 754, 4 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 634
(Sur. Ct. 1938), In re Otis Estate, 158 Misc. 804, 287 N. Y. Supp. 758
(Sur. Ct. 1936), Re Will of Otis, 276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E. (2d) 556
(1937), Re Martin, 165 Misc., 597, 1 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 80 (Sur. Ct.
1937) Re Manger, 165 Misc. 254, 300 N. Y. Supp. 878 (Sur. Ct. 1937)
In re Phelps's Estate, 162 Misc. 703, 295 N. Y. Supp. 840 (Sur. Ct.
1937), In re Chapal's Estate, 161 Misc. 67, 292 N. Y. Supp. 663 (Sur.
Ct. 1934) In re Chapal's Will, 280 N. Y. Supp. 811, 245 App. Div. 818
(Sup. Ct. 2d Dept. 1935) Matter of Chapal's Will, 260 N. Y. 464,
199 N. E. 762 (1936) (Reversing In re Chapal's Will and modifying
In re Chapal's Estate), In re Pelcyger's Estate, 157 Misc. 913, 285
N. Y. Supp. 723 (Sur. Ct. 1936) In re Jackson's Will, 135 Misc. 329,
239 N. Y. Supp. 362 (Sur. Ct. 1929) affirmed, In re Jackson's Will,
232 App. Div 425, 250 N. Y. Supp. 324 (Sup. Ct., 2d Dept. 1931),
reversed on other grounds; In re Jackson's Will, 258 N. Y. 281, 189
N. E. 496 (1932), rehearing denzed; In re Brooklyn Trust Co., 258
N. Y. 610, 180 N. E. 354 (1932), In re Myers' Estate, 161 N. Y. Supp.
1111 (Sur. Ct. 1916), In re Marshall, 43 Misc. 238, 88 N. Y. Supp. 550
(Sur. Ct. 1904), Meldon v. Delvm, 31 App. Div. 146, 53 N. Y. Supp.
172 (Sup. Ct. 1st Dept. 1898) Wallace v. Wallace, 90 S. C. 61, 72 S. E.
553 (1911)-; Re Horn's Estate, 2 Ch. 222 (1924) Re Southwell, 85
L. J. 70 (Ch. 1915), 1 Ch. 942; In re Moore, 54 L. J. 432 (Ch. 1885),
Stewart v Kingsdale, 1 Ir. R. 496 (1902).
In re Nirdlinger's Estate, 327 Pa. 171, 193 Atl. 30 (1937), Re
Nirdlinger, 331 Pa. 135, 200 Atl. 656 (1938) Roosevelt v. Roosevelt,
5 Redf. 264 (N. Y. Surr. 1881) (adopting 5% as a rate of interest)
In re Golden (1893) 1 Ch. 292 (no reason given for the adoption of
4% interest)
The Uniform Principal and Income Act, 9 Uniform Laws Ann.
(1940 Supp.) 278, 281, Sec. 11, lays down the following rule: "(2)
Such income shall be the difference between the net proceeds re-
ceived from the property and the amount which, had it been placed
at simple interest at the rate of five per centum per annum for the
period during which the change was delayed would have produced
the net proceeds at the time of change, but in no event shall such
income be more than the amount by which the net proceeds exceeds
APPORTIONMIENT OF Loss
Canadian Rule. Suich interest payments as have been re-
ceived by the life tenant are added to the net proceeds. The life
tenant shares in the total thus obtained in the ratio established
by dividing the total the life tenant would have received, had
there been no default, by the sum of what both life tenant and
the remainderman would have received had there been no de-
fault. After the life tenant has accounted for that wnch he has
already received, by way of interest payments, the residue of
the net proceeds goes to the remainderman8
Proposed Rule (1) Such interest payments as have been
received by the life tenant are added to the net proceeds. The life
tenant shares in the total thus obtained in the following ratio
take the present value of an annuity of the amount of the annual
interest payment at the mortgage rate of interest (for the period
winch elapsed from the acquisition of the mortgage by the trust
estate to the maturity of the mortgage, or the foreclosure sale,
whichever period is the shorter), divide this by the sum repre-
senting the present value of the annuity plus the present value
of the principal of the mortgage (figured at the mortgage rate
of interest and due in a like number of years) The life tenant
the fair inventory value of the property or in default thereof its mar-
ket value at the time the principal was established or its cost where
purchased later." It is to be noted (1) that the rate of interest is
fixed and arbitrary and (2) that income cannot be more than the
excess of the net proceeds over the fair market value of the invest-
ment at the time the principal was established, et cetera. It seems
that under this rule the life tenant could take none of the net pro-
ceeds until the principal is fully repaid. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS: Sec.
241, com. (c), IM. (4)
'Re Foster, 45 Ch. Div. 629 (1890) followed by In re Plumb, 29
Ont. Rep. 601, 602 (1896). There must be taken: "1. An account
of the amount which would be required to pay off the said security
in full, including both principal and interest, and any other charges
against the same.
"2. An account of what proportion of the said money in the
preceding paragraph mentioned, if any had been paid, would have
been payable to the (life tenant) and the amount which
would have belonged to the principal of the trust fund.
"3. An account of the interest upon the said security, if any,
which had already been paid to (the life tenant) After
taking the said accounts, the amount realized from the security, and
the amount already paid to the (life tenant) are to be
added together, and the said amount is to be divided between(the life tenant) and the estate in proportion to the amount
that they would have been entitled to if the whole of the said security
had been paid in full, and the (life tenant) is to stand
charged as to her portion thereof with the amounts already paid to
her."
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must account for interest payments he has received. The re-
mainder of the net proceeds goes to the remainderman. (2) If,
while the trustee holds the property obtained on foreclosure and
sale, a duty to sell arises, the Restatement Rule applies to that
portion of the property that was equitably owned by the re-
mainderman.
The New York Rule is based on the principle that
"In such an investment situation what is involved is the salvage
of a security The security is security not for principal alone
but for income as well. On a sale, therefore, the (net) pro-
ceeds should be apportioned between principal and income in the
proportion fixed by the respective amounts thereof represented by
the net sale proceeds."'
At the time the security is realized there are two charges
upon it-arrears of interest and also unpaid principal. 10 Beyond
this simple principle the cases present "a hopeless maze of con-
tradictory rulings."" The main difficulty has been the ques-
tion whether "accrued interest" should include interest only to
the date of foreclosure, or rather until final disposition of
the property, and if the latter, then what rate of interest should
be allowed. In Re Will of Otis12 the court said that the fair
thing would be to allow the life tenant the mortgage rate on the
appraisal value of the property for each year, but since such
course is inpractical, the life tenant should be allowed interest
at the mortgage rate until liquidation, for "if the remaindermen
are to participate in the apportionment on the feigned basis of
unimpaired principal, the share of the life tenant should be
computed on the same assumption. " 3
"The court continued: "In the capital account will be the orig-
inal mortgage investment. In the income account will be unpaid in-
terest accrued to the date of sale upon the original capital. The
ratio established by these respective totals determines the respective
interest in the net proceeds of a sale." The term "ratio" as here
used is somewhat confusing, since ratio implies a direct fractional
relationship. Both capital and income. could not "share" in the
net proceeds in one ratio unless they each contribute to the same
amount. Re Will of Otis, 276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E. (2d) 556 (1937).
See Bailey and Rice, op. cit. supra note 1, at 173.10Re Atkinson, (1904) 2 Ch. 160.
In re Pelcyger's Estate, 157 Misc. 913, 285 N. Y. Supp. 723, 744(Sur. Ct. 1936).
=276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E. (2d) 556 (1937).
Id., 11 N. E. (2d) at 557.
The decisions present conflicting holdings on:
Rate of interest. That no interest should be allowed after fore-
closure; in re Jackson's Will, 135 Misc. 329, 239 N. Y. Supp. 362 (Sur.
APPORTIONMENT OF Loss
The restatement rule is adopted, apparently, on the sup-
posed analogy of the foreclosure situation to the case where
unproductive land is held by a trustee,14 and seemingly does not
attempt to differentiate the two. It is said. "The allowance
of interest at current rate from the time of default until the
time of sale recognizes the real situation (viz.) 15 what
rate of interest the trustee could obtain on the investment if the
capital sum were really in hand."' 1 6 Tins rule ignores the fact
Ct. 1929), affirmed, In re Jackson's Will, 232 App. Div. 425, 250 N. Y.
Supp. 324 (Sup. Ct. 2d Dept. 1931), reversed on other grounds.
In re Jackson's Will, 258 N. Y. 281, 179 N. E. 496 (1932), rehearing
denied, In re Brooklyn Trust Co., 258 N. Y. 610, 180 N. E. 354 (1932),
Furmss v. Cruikshank, 191 App. Div. 450, 181 N. Y. Supp. 522 (Sup.
Ct. 1st Dept. 1920) (the life tenant evidently did not ask for an ap-
portionment and it does not appear affirmatively that any appor-
tionment whatsoever was made).
That the mortgage rate should be allowed until the acquisition
of the property by the trust estate and the prevailing rate on trust
investments thereafter until final liquidation; Re Manger, 165 Misc.
254, 300 N. Y. Supp. 878 (Sur. Ct. 1937), In re Phelp's Estate, 162
Misc. 703, 258 N. Y. Supp. 840 (Sur. Ct. 1937; In re Otis Estate, 158
Misc. 804, 287 N. Y. Supp 758 (Sur. Ct. 1936), overruled in Re Will
of Otis, 276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E. (2d) 556 (Sur. Ct. 1937), In matter
of Marshall, 43 Misc. 238, 88 N. Y. Supp. 550 (Sur. Ct. 1904), Meldon
v. Delvin, 31 App. Div. 146, 53 N. Y. Supp. 172 (Sup. Ct., 1st Dept.
1898).
The date of the beginning of the apportionment period is under
all the cases except Re Phillimore (1903) 2 Ch. 942, at the first default
in interest. In that case it was set at the time the mortgage first
appeared insecure.
Generally, capital is the original mortgage investment; Trenton
Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Donnelly, 67 N. J. Eq. 119, 55 Atl. 192(1903), Hagan v. Pratt, 48 N. J. Eq. 206, 21 Atl. 860 (1891), Re Will
of Otis, 276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E. (2d) 556 (Sup. Ct. 1st Dept. 1937),
Meldon v. Devlin, 31 App. Div. 146, 53 N. Y. Supp. 172 (1898), Wal-
lace v. Wallace, 90 S. C. 61, 72 S. E. 553 (1911), In re Moore, 54 L. J.
432 (Ch. 1885), and many other cases. In re Marshall, 43 Misc. 238,
88 N. Y. Supp. 550 (Sur. Ct. 1904), holds that principal is the original
mortgage investment plus any carrying charges advanced from
principal.
For a fuller discussion of the cases on these points see Notes(1936) 103 A. L. R. 1271, (1937) 115 A. L. R. 881, (1938) A. L. R.
1354; Bailey and Rice, op. cit. supra note 1; 2 LEwiN, TRUSTS (Am.
ed. 1889), p. 1228.
" It is "argued that since the duty to convert the unproductive
mortgage arose upon default, the life tenant is entitled to an appor-
tionment upon the basis of an average trust income from that time
until the actual sale." (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 175. See, Bailey and
Rice, op. cit. supra note 1, at 327.
Supplied.
"In re Nirdlinger's Estate, 327 Pa. 171, 193 Atl. 30, 32 (1937),
2 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) Sec. 241.3, at 1370. "Where a loss results
from an investment in the mortgage, it seems hard on the remainder-
man that the life beneficiary should receive income at a greater rate
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that the mortgage is security for the payment of both principal
and interest. Moreover, the rule of apportionment of unpro-
ductive property rests on a duty17 of the trustee to convert the
unproductive trust property into productive property 1s In fore-
closing a mortgage, "no question of intent of settlor or mort-
gagor is involved. In foreclosing the trustee was attempting to
get back both interest and principal, and he succeeded only
partially in ns effort as to each."' 9
What is here called the Canadian Rule was first suggested
in the English case Re Foster,20 which was followed by In re
Pltumb.21 Re Foster was "overruled" by Re Bird22 on the
ground that there was no precedent for the decision and that
under this rule the life tenant might, on final liquidation, re-
ceive nothing if he had already received a large amount of
income for which he must account. It was further said that if
the amount the life tenant had received was sufficiently large
the net proceeds would not be sufficient to cover the sum al-
lotted to the remainderman under the calculation. It is true the
life tenant will receive nothing at final distribution if he has
already received a sufficiently large amount of interest, and the
net proceeds are small. But the statement of this result does
not prove its injustice. If the life tenant is entitled to nothing
in such a situation, he should receive nothing. The question is.
To how much is each entitled9 Moreover, the fact that the
remamderman might be entitled, under the calculation, to more
than the net proceeds cannot be a valid objection from is point
than the usual rate of return on trust investments. It is true that he
would have received a greater income if there had been no default.
But there was a default and interest at the agreed rate was never
paid. Why then should the life beneficiary receive interest at that
rate? Where the trust estate includes at the outset unproductive
land which the trustee is under a duty to sell, the life beneficiary
receives out of the proceeds income only at the trust rate. It is be-
lieved that the same rule should apply where the property subse-
quently becomes unproductive." (1937) 4 U. of Pitts. L. Rev 82;(1930) 36 Mich L. Rev 340.
'RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, Sec. 241, subsection 1.
' Note (1936) 49 Harv L. Rev 805.
4 BOGERT on TRUSTS and TRUSTEES (1935) Sec. 820, at 2386.
45 Ch. Div. 629 (1890).
2127 Ont. Rep. 601 (1896)(1901) 1 Ch. 916. (The case was one of unauthorized invest-
ment not involving a mortgage.) This rule was also overruled in
Re Atlnson (1904) 2 Ch. 160, which followed Re Moore, 54 L. J.
432 (Ch. 1885)
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of view, since he must receive less under any calculation which
would give the life tenant part of the net proceeds.
It remains to consider the merits of the rules.
1. The Two Sums Which Form the Ratio of Apportion-
ment.
In Re Atkianson,23 Cozens Hardy, L. J., said
"I think the true way to approach this question is to treat it as
though the whqle security had been realized and had produced a
certain sum. What would then be the mquiry which the court would
have to make? What was due on the security at the time of realiza-
tion? The answer would be that the capital and the arrears of in-
terest, and no more, were due On what principal are you going
to apportion them? Just in the same way as you would if it were a
contributory mortgage, part owing to A and part owing to B."
And in it re Pelcyger's Estate,24 it was said.
"In a bond secured by a mortgage, the holder possesses a dual
obligation of the mortgagor, namely- (1) for the payment of a speci-
fied principal sum at a time or times set forth therein, and (2)1 a
certain rate of interest on such principal sum, payable on stipulated
dates. The mortgage property is equally security for both obliga-
tions. When the holder is a trustee, the equitable owner of the
former obligation is the remainderman, and of the latter, the income
beneficiary. When default occurs for a specified period in the pay-
ment of interest, both obligations become immediately payable to
the trustee and the mortgage property is equally answerable for
both."
Suppose the case of a mortgage conditioned on the pay-
ment of $1,000 in ten years and $60 interest at the end of each
year, with A entitled to the principal and B to the income. A
can be entitled to the $1,000 only at the end of ten years, or on
default of payment of interest, which would give a right to fore-
closure. A's security interest then in the mortgage is the pres-
ent value of $1,000 payable in ten years if there is no default
of the mortgage; or in event of default and foreclosure, the pres-
ent value of $1,000 payable at that time. B's security interest
is the present value of an annuity, of $60 per year for a like
period. The New York Rule does not take into account the fact
that B's money, the payment of which is secured by the mort-
gage, is due earlier than that of A. In the case In re Moore26
(1904) 2 Ch. 160, 169.
157 Misc. 913, 285 N. Y. Supp. 723, 744 (Sur. Ct. 1936)
' Numbers supplied.
54 L. J. 432 (Ch. 1885).
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the life tenant's claim to interest upon the unpaid installments
of interest was dismissed on the ground that under the mort-
gage all that the life tenant could have got was simple interest
on the original investment and that there was no fund out of
which to pay compound interest. Concededly, there is no fund
out of which to pay compound interest, not is there a fund out
of which all the principal and interest payments in arrears can
be paid. The problem is rather on what basis shall the insuffi-
cient sum be distributed. The Restatement Rule does not take
into account the fact that a security transaction is involved.
2. Date of Beginning the Apportionment Period.
In no proper sense can it be said that the land, or the pro-
ceeds of the land, still stand as security for that interest that
has been paid the life tenant.27 The New York Court rule
recognized this fact by dating the period of apportionment from
the first default.28 The rule announced by the Restatement
imposes on the trustee a duty, at the first default, to convert the
mortgage into an investment which will earn the prevailing rate
on trust investments.29 The Canadian rule and the submitted
rule are based on the view that the beginning of the period fix-
ing the relative interests of the life tenant and remainderman
is fixed by the acquisition of the mortgage by the trust estate.
Again, take the example of a mortgage for $1,000 payable in ten
years, A being entitled to the principal and B to the interest.
Clearly, when the mortgage is made, A is secured for the pay-
ment of $1,000 in ten years, and B to $60 per year at the end of
each of the years. Does the relative security interest of B at the
end of each year decrease as that of A increases ? This must be
answered in the affirmative if it is conceded that B has an abso-
lute right to keep that which he has received, and still demand a
share of the net proceeds, no matter how small, in proportion to
what is still due him. Otherwise, B has received a part of the
total sum for which the mortgage stood security, for which he
must account in the final apportionment.
3. Date of Ending the Apportionment Period.
Since the Restatement Rule is founded on the "duty" of
ITRe Atkinson (1904) 2 Ch. 160, 166.
"For variations of this rule see note 14 supra.
"RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, Sec. 241, subsection 1, illustration 4.
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the trustee to convert the mortgage into productive trust prop-
erty, it follows logically that the period of apportionment
should run until the final realization on the security The New
York Rule, as set out m the Otisso and ChapaI31 cases, adopts
the same time for the termination of the period. This result
has not been reached in all the cases32 and has been severely
criticized. 33 It is clear that there is no longer an obligation to
pay interest.3 4 If the trustee acts properly in taking the prop-
erty over 35 the life tenant and the remamderman then become
equitable owners of the property in proportion to the amount
of their respective equitable claims which they had against the
property when it was acquired by the trust estate. 36 Assuming
that the trustee is justified in carrying the property in anticipa-
tion of an increase in the amount that can ultimately be
realized, such a carrying is a joint venture, for the benefit of
"Re Will of Otis, 276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E. (2d) 80 (1937).
"Matter of Chapal's Will, 269 N. Y. 454, 199 N. E. 762 (1936).
2See note 14 supra.
"See note 34 znfra.
'This seems to result from " the indulgence of this fiction,
that m spite of the fact that the original investment in the bond and
mortgage had ceased to exist, either by its foreclosure, or payment
in satisfaction of a deed for the premises, the income beneficiary was
still entitled to the interest thereon. The right to receive interest,
either legally or equitably, implies the indispensable correlative of a
person obliged to pay it, but in the situation under discussion, there
is no obligor." In re Pelcyger's Estate, 157 Misc. 913, 285 N. Y. Supp.
723 (Sur. Ct. 1936). " allowance of the mortgage rate through-
out, seems especially unsound, since it involves either a guarantee
that a mortgage will always earn its full rate until sale, or the
imposition of a duty upon the trustee to convert at the first instance
of default into a mortgage bearing the same rate as the defaulted in-
vestment." Note (1936) 49 Harv. L. 805, at 810.
"The purchase of the property by the trustee was not a pur-
chase of real property but " was in effect an act intended only
as temporary, in order to prevent immediate loss to the estate." In
re Marshall, 43 Misc. 238, 8 N. Y. Supp. 550, 553 (Sur. Ct. 1904). See
generally, 2 SCOTT, TRusTs (1939) Sec. 241.3; Brandeis, Trust Admr
Apportionment of Proceeds of Sale of Unproductive Land and
Expenses (1930) 9 N. C. L. Rev. 127.
"In re Pelcyger's Estate, op. cit. supra note 24, at 744, the court
said: "If, in such a case, the entire security is taken over in satisfac-
tion of the dual obligation, the purchase price of the property thus
received consists of the unpaid principal plus the unpaid interest,
and thereafter the asset purchased by the extinguishment of the
money claims becomes the equitable property of the two persons
whose money claims were extinguished by its acquisition, the rela-
tive ownerships being in precise proportion to their contributions to
the cost of acquisition."
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both life tenant and remainderman.3 If there is an appreciation
in the value of the property each will benefit in proportion to
his "investment." If the trustee is justified in carrying the
property in anticipation of appreciation in value, it is difficult
to see under what reasoning income should be allowed to accrue
to the life tenant, since the original obligation to pay interest no
longer exists, 38 nor is the trustee under a duty to sell the prop-
erty 39 If during the carrying period a duty to sell the property
arises, what does the life tenant lose if the trustee fails to dis-
charge the duty promptly q He loses the use of a sum equal to
the value of that portion of the property equitably owned by
him, and the income at the current rate on trust investments, on
that portion of the property equitably owned by the remainder-
man. Why should the remainderman restore to the life tenant
the loss of the use of the life tenant's equitable part, which loss
is not occasioned through any fault or with any profit to the
remainderman, but solely through the delay of the trustee? It
seems that justice would be done by allowing an apportionment
of that part of the property represented by the equity of the
remainderman, in accordance with the Restatement rule.
4. Sum to be Apportioned.
Under each of the rules there is one sum to be apportioned,
s. e., the net proceeds of the security The New York rule solves
the problem by asking simply At the time of the sale what
parts of the original claims of life tenant and remainderman
were unpaidQ40 The Restatement rule finds a duty to realize on
the security at the first default in payments of interest, and as-
' In re Pelcyger's Estate, supra note 24; In re Tuttle, 49 N. J. Eq.
(4 Dick.) 259, 24 Atl. 1, 2 (1892), "If delay be advisable (in realiz-
ing the security) it should be held to be a joint venture of the life
tenant and the remainderman, and to that end the mncome should be
allowed to accrue until the delay terminates." (Italics ours.) It
seems to the writer that since a joint venture was involved, the
necessary inference is just the opposite of the one above drawn,
that is, that income should not be allowed to accrue to the termina-
tion of the delay Hudson County National Bank v. Woodruff, 122
N. 3. Eq. 444, 194 Atl. 266, 270 (1937) "The properties having been
held for anticipated but unattained appreciation, the delay should
be held to be a joint venture between the life tenant and remain-
derman, because such an investment situation involves the salvage
of a security, not for principal alone but for income as well."
I See note 34 supra.
' See note 35 supra.
'Re Atkinson, supra note 23.
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sumes, that regardless of the security nature of the transaction,
to the life tenant is due the prevailing rate of return on trust
investments.4 1 The proposed rule and the Canadian rule42
recognize that no more can be apportioned than the sum in hand.
They proceed on the theory that the question concerns the re-
spective interests of the life tenant and the remamderman. The
way to determine these is to ascertain what total interests were
originally secured by the mortgage, then ascertain what sums,
both on intermediate payments and final liqmdation, have been
realized. The proposed rule gives to each, out of the total sum
realized, an amount proportional to his security interest in the
mortgage, and each would account for that which he has already
received. 43
II. PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE TAKEN BACK ON SALE OF
SALVAGED PROPERTY.
Since in some cases the trustee cannot make the most advan-
tageous sale of the salvaged security for all cash, he must accept
as part payment a purchase money mortgage on the salvaged
property In Re Nirdlinger's Estate44 the view was taken that
since the life tenant is ordinarily entitled to receive his share
in cash and the remainderman's share is to be reinvested, the
purchase money mortgage is to be considered as such investment,
and the mortgage should be allotted to corpus and the life tenant
should receive all cash. The New York court has taken the view
that "both the life tenant and the remainderman should have
the responsibility of liquidating the new security, i. e., the pur-
chase-money mortgage", 4  and hence the mortgage should be
apportioned to income and corpus in the same proportion as the
cash proceeds.4"
Since the rule applicable to original trust investments does
not apply where the trustee is charged with the duty of liquidat-
" See notes 15 and 16 supra; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, Sec. 241, sub-
section 1, comment (b), illustration 4.
"No reasons for the method adopted were given in either Re
Foster, supra note 20, or In re Plumb, supra note 21.
For an illustration of the rules see Appendix, rnfra.
"327 Pa. 171, 193 AtI. 30 (1937). See also Bailey and Rice,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 329.
'Re Manger, 165 Misc. 254, 300 N. Y. Supp. 878 (Sur. Ct. 1937)
'Re Otis, 276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E. (2d) 556 (1937) In re
Martin's Estate, 1 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 80, 165 Misc. 597 (Sur. Ct. 1937),
Re Chapal's Estate, 292 N. Y. Supp. 663, 161 Misc. 67 (Sur. Ct. 1934).
L. J.-5
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ing a security the trustee may legally take back a mortgage on
the salvaged propery, in which there is greater risk than would
be permissible in an original investment.47 It follows that the
mortgage taken back may be one of two types, viz., (a) such
a mortgage as would be a legal trust investment if the investment
were original or (b) a mortgage which the trustee can take
legally only because of the necessity of the salvage situation.
It seems that herein is a valid basis of distinction, in situation
(a) the salvage operation might well be regarded as at an end,
since by allotting all of the purchase money mortgage to corpus,
the remamdermen would not be prejudiced, and they should
not be heard to complain so long as the principal of the trust
is invested in legal trust securities. In situation (b) since
the life tenant, and remaindermen are engaged in a joint ven-
ture in salvaging the security for the benefit of both,48 the life
tenant should not be allowed to shift all of the extraordinary
risk to the remaindermen, which risk is in part for the benefit
of the life tenant and arises solely from the nature of the trans-
action. Until the trustee has in Ins hands cash or a legal trust
investment, it is logical to say the salvage transaction is not at
an end. 49
III. ExcHANGE oF DEFAULTED MORTGAGE FOR OTHER
SECURITIES.
In Re OtisS the trustee exchanged one of the mortgages
which he held (as part of the trust estate) for Home Owner's
Loan Corporation bonds that were subsequently sold for less
than the accrued interest and principal due on the mortgage.
The New York Court of Appeals regarded the transaction as the
exchange of one capital asset for another and held that the gen-
eral rule that any profit or loss on the sale of a capital asset is
IIn Re Crnmm's Estate, 288 N. Y. Supp, 552, 159 Misc. 499
(Sur. Ct. 1936).
"See notes 36 and 37 supra.
" See (1937) 51 Harv L. Rev 175. It was intimated in Re
Otis, 276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E. (2d) 556, 558 (1937) that the New York
court might take tins view. After holding the mortgage back should
be apportioned between principal and income, the court said: "We do
not see how anything else can fairly be done except in a case in
which it is conceded that the purchase money mortgage meets the
statutory test of a valid new investment."
276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E. (2d) 556 (1937).
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reaped or borne by principal 51 applied,52 and hence there should
be no apportionment of the net proceeds since he believed the
transaction to be essentially a salvage operation and was there-
fore unable to see any valid distinction between tins situation
and the one in winch the trustee takes over the mortgage prop-
erty and ultimately sells it at a loss.5 8
"A trustee standing as he does between the life tenant and
remaindermen, must not favor one at the expense of the other."54
In such situations a mortgage is security for the payment of
interest to the life tenant, equally as it is security for the pay-
ment of the principal to corpus. 55 Therefore, when the trustee
exchanged the mortgage for the bonds he extinguished these two
security interests and took m lieu thereof the bonds. To hold
that the trustee can thus destroy the security interest of the life
tenant and give what he has received in exchange therefor to the
remamderman, is most clearly to "favor one at the expense of
the other." If substance be looked to rather than form, what
matter is it that the mortgage is in the one case realized by the
sale of the land itself and m the other by the sale of bonds
for winch the mortgage was exchanged 2
In the Otis case, the Home Owner's Loan Corporation bonds
5II ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939) Sec. 233.1.
1 "The general situation is different when a trust security other
than a mortgage investment goes into default. A market then exists
in winch bids for the defaulted security are currently quoted. No
carrying period is inherent in the process of liquidation in that case.
Transfer of such a security by a trustee for a consideration paid m
cash (or in cash plus securities lawful for trustees) is the sale or
exchange of a capital asset. It is not a salvage operation. The sale
proceeds go to the capital account, and any loss of principal is
chargeable thereto We think the same practice should be
followed where a trustee transfers a defaulted mortgage for cash or
for securities which square with the statutory measure of a valid
trust investment." Re Will of Otis, op. cit. supra, note 51, 11 N. E.
(2d) at 558.
""No distinction may be drawn, on the one hand, between the
foreclosure and subsequent sale of the real property by the trustee,
and, on the other hand, between the substitution of Home Owner's
Loan Corporation bonds for the original mortgage and their subse-
quent sale. Each form of transaction is essentially a salvage opera-
tion. The loss suffered by the life tenant in unpaid interest must be
given due consideration and restored as far as equitably possible."
In Re Otis Estate, 287 N. Y. Supp. 758, 158 Misc. 808 (Sur. 1936)
reversed, In re Will of Otis, op. cit. supra, note 51.
"Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Tucker, 52 R. I. 277, 160
Atl. 465 (1932).
"See above text and note 24 supra.
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were a legal trust investment. 56 A case might arise in winch the
trustee would be justified in taking securities that did not
meet the test of a legal investment.57 It seems tns would offer
no great difficulty for in the former case an apportionment in
specie could be made at the tne of the exchange, or the life
tenant's share could be purchased for corpus with other prin-
cipal. In the latter the trustee could carry the securities until
a duty to sell arose, the carrying being regarded as the carrying
of foreclosed realty, as a joint venture5 s of the beneficiary and
the remainderman.
IV NET PROCEEDS.
Given the gross proceeds from the sale of the salvaged prop-
erty, how are the net proceeds determined? There is apparently
no conflict in the cases on the point that the gross proceeds
should be used first to pay foreclosure expenses and the costs of
the sale of the property 59 Also, where the trustee acquires the
mortgaged property and carries it for some time before final
liquidation, as part of the trust estate, the rents collected on the
property should be used to pay current carrying charges.60
However, where the rents are insufficient to meet the carrying
charges this unammity of result completely disappears.61 There
have been holdings, to the effect that such deficit is to be met
by sums
1. Advanced from principal, (a) to be repaid as such from rents
or the proceeds of the property on final liquidation,1' (b) to be
In Re Otis, cited supra note 51.
"Compare with case of purchase money mortgage taken back
on sale of salvaged property, note 48 supra.
"See text above at note 37.
'Re Will of-Otis, 276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E. (2d) 556 (1937), Re
Pelcyger's Estate, 157 Misc. 913, 285 N. Y. Supp. 723 (Sur. Ct. 1936).
'Re Phelps' Estate, 162 Misc. 703, 295 N. Y. Supp. 840 (Sur. Ct.
1937), Re Otis Estate, 158 Misc. 804, 287 N. Y. Supp. 758 (Sur. Ct.
1936), Re Pelcyger's Estate, 157 Misc. 913, 285 N. Y. Supp. 723 (Sur.
Ct. 1936), Re Nirdlinger, 331 Pa. 135, 200 At. 656 (1938)
Re Pelcyger's Estate, 157 Misc. 913, 285 N. Y. Supp. 723 (Sur.
Ct. 1936).
'Hudson Co. Natl. Bank v Woodruff, 122 N. J. Eq. 444, 194 At.
266 (1937), Equitable Trust Co. v. Swobada, 113 N. J. Eq. 399, 167
Atl. 525 (1933), Re Will of Otis, 276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E. (2d) 556
(1937) Re Manger's Will, 300 N. Y. Supp. 878, 165 Misc. 254 (Sur.
Ct. 1937), Matter of Chapal's Will, 269 N. Y. 464, 199 N. E. 762
(1936), In re Haffin's Will, 280 N. Y. Supp. 357, 155 Misc. 774 (Sur.
Ct. 1935), Re Nirdlinger, 331 Pa. 135, 200 Atl. 656 (1938)
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added to the capital account in determining the total of the cap-
ital investment, as used in fixing the apportionment ratio' and,(c) apparently not to be repaid.& '
2. Advanced from other income of the trust (a) to be repaid from
rents or the proceeds on final liquidations' and (b) apparently
not to be repaid.'
3. Borrowed capital from an independent source if there is msuffi-
cient capital to make such advancements, although there is
other income sufficient to pay the carrying charges.
It seems to be fairly well settled that carrying charges
should be advanced from principal, and repaid as such before
any apportionment is made.68 This seems to be a logical and
equitable solution, for the life beneficiary is not required to give
up other income, and moreover, life tenant and remaindermen
each bear a share proportionate to their respective equitable
ownership in the property 69
The further question arises. Should interest be paid on the
sum advanced from principal for carrying charges, and paid to
the life tenant as mcome2 In Re Otis" the court, in reversing
the decision of the lower court allowing interest to the life ten-
ant, said.
"We think this gives the life tenant too much. The parties
are engaged in a joint salvage venture. Carrying charges must be
"'In re Meyers Estate, 161 N. Y. Supp. 1111 (Sur. Ct. 1916),
Matter of Marshall, 43 Misc. 238, 88 N. Y. Supp. 550 (1904).
"'What is paid to protect this property is clearly for the benefit
of the principal. It is not in any way to produce income as the only
object of protecting the property is so that is can be sold for some-
thing which will increase the principal of the trust." Matter of Pit-
ney, 113 App. Div. 845, 847, 99 N. Y. Supp. 588, 590 (Sup. Ct. 1906)
See also Furmiss v. Cruikshank, 191 App. Div. 450, 181 N. Y. Supp.
522 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (It does not appear there was an apportion-
ment of the net proceeds in this case.) Matter of Menzie's Estate, 54
Misc. 188, 105 N. Y. Supp. 925 (Sur. Ct. 1907).
In Re Chapal's Will, 280 N. Y. Supp. 811, 245 App. Div. 818(Sup. Ct. 1935) (reversed in Matter of Chapal's Will, 269 N. Y. 464,
192 N. E. 762 (1936)).
"Matter of Brooklyn Trust Co., 192 Misc. 674, 157 N. Y. Supp.
547 (Sur. Ct. 1916), affirmed 173 App. Div 948, 158 N. Y. Supp. 1109(Sup. Ct. 1916), affirmed 219 N. Y. 565, 114 N. E. 1061 (1916),
Meldon v. Delvm, 31 App. Div. 146, 63 N. Y. Supp. 172 (Sup. Ct.
1898), affirmed 167 N. Y. 573, 60 N. E. 1116 (1901) (See Re
Pelcyger's Estate, 157 Misc. 913, 285 N. Y. Supp. 723, 725, 739 (Sur.
Ct. (1936)
1Re McKeogh, 158 Misc. 734, 286 N. Y. Supp. 862 (Sur. Ct.
1936).
'Hudson Co. Natl. Bank v Woodruff, 122 N. J. Eq. 444, 194 Atl.
266 (1937), Re Otis, 276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E. (2d) 556 (1937), Re
Nirdlinger, 331 Pa. 135, 200 Atl. 656 (1938)
"See Note 36, supra, (1937) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 340.
276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E. (2d) 556, 557 (1937)
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met from principal because there is no income wherewith to pay
them. Interest on each item would have to be computed at
the currently prevailing rate for legal investments, a fluctuating fac-
tor not always readily obtainable. The parties can hardly be thought
to have contemplated such actuarial calculations. In view of all
tbis and of the fact that the remamdermen run by far the greater
hazard, we think the life tenant must be supposed to have said to
them, 'You put up all the money for the salvage and I won't expect
any interest on it.' ""
The other vew, and seemingly the sound one, is well stated
in Be Pelcyger's Estate .72
c The court believes that invidious distinction should
not be made depending on whether or not the trust estate had free
capital available to pay the costs of foreclosure. If it did not and
borrowing from an outside source were necessary, capital so pro-
cured would receive an interest return winch would be properly
chargeable as an additional salvage expense. If the same method
were not adopted where the trust capital is used, then income
beneficiary would be deprived of a part of ins gift, namely, the use
of so much of the capital as is thus employed for the partial benefit
of the remamderman. It follows that the average daily capital em-
ployed in the salvage operation should be computed and a reason-
able return allowed thereon as an added salvage cost. Since the
security for such advances would usually be excellent,, the return
should approximate the current legal investment rate for the
period. ,,74
V RENTS.
In case the rents collected on the property while it is being
carried by the trustee after foreclosure of the mortgage, exceed
the carrying charges, what is the proper disposition of such sur-
plus? In the Pennsylvania case of Re Nirdlinger75 the follow-
mg solutions were proposed
"(1) That the net rents shall be held by the trustee until the
properties are sold, when the formulaO' fixed by us shall be applied;'
Accord: In re Wilson's Estate, 167 Misc. 754, 4 N. Y. Supp. (2d)
634 (Sur. Ct. 1938), In re Manger's Will, 165 Misc. 254, 300 N. Y.
Supp. 878 (Sur. Ct. 1937), In re Chapal's Estate, 161 Misc. 69, 292
N. Y. Supp. 663 (Sur. Ct. 1934).
157 Misc. 913, 285 N. Y. Supp. 723, 752 (Sur. Ct. 1936).
'The advances constitute a prior claim on both the income from
the property and the proceeds on final liquidation. See cases cited,
note 55 supra.
"Accord: Re Nirdlinger's Estate, 327 Pa. 171, 193 Atl. 30 (1937);
In re Otis' Estate, 158 Misc. 804, 287 N. Y. Supp. 758 (Sur. Ct. 1936)
(reversed by In re Otis, op. cit. note 62 supra.)
"331 Pa. 135, 200 Atl. 656 (1938)
" The court apparently means the Restatement Rule of Appor-
tionment of net proceeds..
'In re Otis' Estate, 158 Misc. 804, 287 N. Y. Supp. 758 (Sur. Ct.
1936) (See modification of tins holding made in Re Otis, op. cit.
note 79 snfra), See also Hubbard v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co. of
Baltimore, 172 Md. 645, 192 Atl. 592 (1937).
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"(2) That the trustee may pay over the rents or a portion
thereof to the life tenants m the trustee's discretion;"
"(3) That all the net rents shall be paid over to the life ten-
ants, (a) with a liability to refund to the corpus of the trust any
amount received m excess of that which the formula gives; (b)
without requirement to refund anything."'
The Pennsylvania court believed "the real intent of testa-
tors is that life tenants shall presently receive accruing in-
come";80 further if trustees were given discretion whether to
pay the income over, they would m most instances (to avoid
any chance of liability) retain the net rents until final dis-
tribution. The court held that the trustees must pay the rents
over to the life tenants as they accumulate, and that the life
tenants would be under an obligation to refund "where they
have received more than would be due them under the
formula.'"81
It is true the testator intended the life tenant to have the
accruing income. It is equally true that he did not intend the
life tenant to have any part of the sum which should constitute
corpus, otherwise the trust would not have been created. Hence
it would seem that the payment to the life beneficiary of all of
the net rents, when ultimately he may have to make some re-
payment to the corpus, is unjustified.
To give the trustee discretion when and what amounts he
should pay to the life tenant, is open to the same criticism and
in addition it is objectionable on the reasoning advanced in Be
Nirdinger 8 2 Under the New York rule 3 of apportionment
any payment of rents to the life tenant without a proportionate
payment to corpus is inconsistent with the theory that the fore-
closed property is equitably owned by the life tenant and
the remaindermen (in proportion to their respective claims
which were satisfied when the property was acquired by the
trust estate).84 This is true since under that rule the ratio of
"'Re Otis, 276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E. (2d) 556 (1937) In re
Manger's Will, 165 Misc. 254, 300 N. Y. Supp. 78 (Sur. Ct. 1937), In
re Phelps' Estate, 162 Misc. 703, 295 N. Y. Supp. 840 (1937), Re
Chapal, 269 N. Y. 464, 199 N. E. 762 (1936).
",In re Horn's Estate (1924) 2 Ch. 222 (However, there was a
statute which the court construed to place the property obtained on
foreclosure of a mortgage in so far as possible as if it had originally
formed part of the testator's estate).
'Re Nirdlinger, 331 Pa. 135, 200 Aft. 656, 657 (1938).
' Ibid, 200 Atl. 656, at 657.
'See text above at note 81.
'See text above, also cases cited note 6, supra.
"See text above, also notes 36 and 37, supra.
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apportionment is fixed by the respective claims of life tenant
and remainderman as of the time of final liquidation. There-
fore, to the extent that the life tenant's claim is reduced by
receiving net rents, without a proportionate payment being
made to corpus, the ratio of the life tenant's share of the net
proceeds will be diminished, and hence his share of the ultimate
loss on the security
The view that the trustee should m all instances allow the
rents to accumulate until final distribution of the net proceeds
would deny to both life tenant and remainderman the bene-
ficial use of the funds lying idle.
If it is correct that on the acquisition of the mortgaged
property by the trustee, the life tenant and the remainderman
become equitable owners of the property so acquired, then the
payment of all the rents to the life tenant without any liability
on his part to refund any overpayment, seems clearly wrong.
Equity should be done the life tenant. But to be equitable does
not mean to be charitable. What justification is there for tak-
ing that which is the remainderman's and giving it to the life
tenant 9 5
It is submitted that the trustee should have discretion, to be
exercised in view of the needs of the life tenant and the trust
estate,86 whether to retain the net rents or pay them over, and if
all or any part of the rents is paid over, to each (life tenant and
remainderman) should go a share proportionate to his equitable
ownership of the property 8 7 This would be a simple matter
under the submitted rule of apportionment.8 8 Under this rule
the ratio in which each is to share in the net proceeds is fixed on
the termination of the security by the foreclosure and sale, and
" The court, in Re Pelcyger's Estate, 157 Misc. 913, 285 N. Y.
Supp. 723, at 746 (Sur. Ct. 1936) in discussing whether or not the
life tenant should be allowed interest after the foreclosure of the
property said, " the primary principle elsewhere umversally
applied is that there shall never be any entrenching upon the rights
of the remaindermen except where a corresponding benefit is
demonstrated."
11 "This discretion, moreover, should be exercised with appropri-
ate regard for the fact that unless a life tenant gets cash he does not
get anything in the here and now." Re Otis, 276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E.
(2d) 556, 559 (1937).
'This view was adopted in Re Acketill, (1891), Ir. L. R. 27 Eq.
331.
, See text above, page 2.
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does not subsequently change. Under the New York and the
Restatement rules, an approximation subject to final adjustment
would have to be made, since the proportion in which the life
tenant and remaindermen share in the net proceeds cannot be
finally determined until the date of final liquidation.
Under this method the life tenant would receive all he could
justly ask. (a) a share of the net rents proportionate to his
equitable ownership of the property (if and when the trustee
was under a duty to pay them over) and (b) the share to which
the remainderman was entitled would be invested as a part of
the corpus of the trust, on the whole of which the life tenant
would be entitled to income.8 9
SUM MARY.
A mortgage carried as part of a trust estate, established for
the benefit of life tenants and remainderman, is security for the
payment of two sums, (a) the annual interest payments to the
life tenant, and (b) the principal to the corpus. If it becomes
necessary for the trustee to acquire the mortgaged property
through foreclosure or some other means and if the intention of
the testator cannot be ascertained, the net proceeds of the sal-
vaged property must be apportioned between life tenants and
remamderman according to some rule of law which will give
each a share proportionate to his equity in the mortgage.
Under the New York rule the life tenant and remainderman
share in the net proceeds in proportion to their respective claims
against the mortgaged property as of the time of final liquida-
tion of the security Since this rule allows interest to accrue
during the time the trustee carries the property, it disregards
the fact that foreclosure of the mortgage terminated the obliga-
tion of the mortgagor to pay interest.
The Restatement rule is the same as that for the apportion-
ment of the proceeds of unproductive land which the trustee
carries after he is under a duty to convert it into productive
trust assets, viz. the remainderman is given that part of th.e
net proceeds which if invested when the first default in interest
9 It should be noted that income on that part of a purchase
money mortgage taken back by the trustee on sale of the salvaged
property, and allotted to corpus is true income. See In re Martin's
Estate, 65 Misc. 597, 1 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 80 (Sur. Ct. 1937)
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occurred, would with interest at the current rate on trust invest-
ments equal the net proceeds at the tune of final realization. The
security nature of the transaction is disregarded under tins rule.
Moreover, the rule of apportionment applicable to unproductive
land is founded on the duty of the trustee to convert, a factor
that is not present in the mortgage situation.
Neither of the above rules takes into account the fact that
the life tenant may have already received a greater proportion
of his original security interest in the mortgage than the remain-
derman would receive if he took the whole of the net proceeds.
By the Canadian Rule, life tenant and remainderman must
bring into hotch pot to add to the net proceeds that winch they
have already received toward the satisfaction of their respective
security interests and each is awarded a share in the total thus
obtained in proportion to what each would have received had
there been no default. This rule does not take into account the
fact that the life tenant's right to interest may be cut off by
default and foreclosure. Neither of the above three rules gives
any consideration to the fact that payment of the sums secured
to the life tenant were due at an earlier date than payment of
principal.
Under the rule suggested in this paper, life tenant and re-
maindermen must bring into hotch pot and add to the net pro-
ceeds that winch they have already received toward the satisfac-
tion of their respective security interests. Each then shares in
the total thus obtained in proportion to ins respective original
security interests in the property (The security interest of the
remainderman is calculated by finding the present value of the
principal of the mortgage due in the number of years from the
acquisition of the mortgage by the trust estate to the maturity
of the mortgage, or its foreclosure, winchever period is shorter.
The security interest of the life tenant is found by ascertaining
the present value of an annuity of the amount of the annual
interest payments for a like number of years.)
It seems to the writer that this rule is open to none of the
objections advanced to the first three rules. It does not allow
interest to accrue after the obligation to pay is terminated. Nor
is it founded on a fictitious duty of the trustee to convert the
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mortgage into productive assets. It takes into account that
which has already been received by each and the fact that the
sums secured to the life tenant are due sooner than those
secured to the remainderman.
Where a purchase money mortgage is taken back by the
trustee on a sale of property he has acquired by foreclosure, if
the mortgage meets the test of a legal trust investment, the
salvage operation may well be regarded as at an end, the mort-
gage apportioned to corpus, and the life tenant given all cash.
If there is extraordinary risk in the mortgage the life tenant
should help liquidate the new security, hence the mortgage
should be apportioned in the same proportion as the cash.
It has been held that an exchange by the trustee of a
defaulted mortgage for other legal trust securities, constituted
the exchange of one capital asset for, another and that there
should be no apportionment of the net proceeds of the sale of
such security On principal, it seems that this amounted to tak-
ng that which was the life tenant's and giving it to the re-
mainderman, for the security interest of the life tenant was
terminated and that which was received in exchange appropri-
ated to corpus.
If rents on the salvaged property which is being carried by
the trustee are not sufficient to pay current carrying charges,
the deficit should be advanced from principal, to be repaid in
full from net proceeds before any apportionment is made. Al-
though the cases are in conflict, the sounder view seems to be
that the life tenant should be allowed interest to be paid from
the net proceeds on the capital sums thus advanced. If such
interest is not allowed the life tenant will be deprived of part
of his gift-i. e.) the right to the income on the whole of the
corpus.
In cases where the net rents exceed the carrying charges, the
decisions are conflicting as to whether or not, and under what
circumstances the surplus should be paid over to the life ten-
ant. In view of the fact that the trustee is engaged in a salvage
operation, for the jomt benefit of remainderman and life tenant,
it seems that each is entitled to a share of the net rents in pro-
portion to his equitable ownership of the property Also, it
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would seem wise to give the trustee discretion as to when and in
what amounts to distribute. Tins discretion should be exercised
in consideration of the present needs of the life tenant, and the
probable future expenses in carrying the property
APPENDIX
ILLUSTRATIONS OF TE RULES
The rules may be illustrated by the following hypothetical
cases
1. The trust estate acquires a mortgage conditioned on the
payment of $1,000 at the end of 10 years, and $60 interest at the
end of each year. If there were default m any interest payment,
the trustee might foreclose inmediately to realize both accrued
interest and principal. No interest payments were made. The
trustee, not violating Ins duty, foreclosed at the end of the tenth
year and realized from the property, $1,790.85.1
2. Same facts as (1) except, the first six annual interest
payments were made; the trustee foreclosed at the end of the
tenth year realizing $1,000 from the property
3. Same facts as (2) except, the trustee realizes only $500
on the sale of the property
4. Same facts as (1) except, the trustee acquired the mort-
gaged property at the end of the tenth year and carried it for
fifteen years, realizing therefor, $1,000.
5. Same facts as (4) except at the end of the fifth year the
trustee was under a duty to sell the property so carried.
The results reached by applying the four rules to the above
situations are set forth in the following table
'This figure was obtained by adding to the principal of the
mortgage the amount of an annuity of $60, at six per cent for ten
years. See Hart, the Mathematics of Investment, Table VII, p. 52,
col. 6.
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terest, t, the time from default to the final realization on the prop-
APPORTIONMENT OF Loss
erty, P, the principal of the mortgage, and n the net proceeds, the
life tenant's share would be found by the formula:
Life Tenant's Share = P+ X nrt P + P
600
1. g. L. T. S. - x 1,790.85 = 671.571600
Under the Restatement rule with r the prevailing rate on trust
investments, the formula is the same. i. g.
L. T.S. .04 X 6 X 1000
.04 x 6 x 1000 + 1000
Under the Canadian rule where r is the mortgage rate, t the
time from acquisition of the security by the trust estate until the
mortgage is due, P the principal, N the net proceeds, and R the pay-
ments the life tenant has received, the life tenant's share is found by
the formula:
L.T.S. t- + x (N + R) - R,r t P +u P
Under the submitted rule where P is the principal, I the annual
interest payment (rP as under the New York rule), x the present
value of an annuity of $1 for the number of years from the acquisi-
tion of the mortgage by the trust estate, until the maturity of the
mortgage or foreclosure and sale, taking whichever period is shorter;
y, the present value of $1 due in a like period, R the interest
payments that have been received by the life tenant; N the net pro-
ceeds; the life tenant's share is found by the formula:
Ix
L. T. S.= x (N + R) - R. z. g. in Case IPy + Ix
x = 7.3601 (see Hart, op. cit. supra note 43, Table VIII, p. 62)
I = 60.
y .5584 (Hart, op. cit. supra, Table V, p. 42)
N - 1790.85.
R-0
P = 1,000.
7.3601 X 60
L. T. S. = X (N+0) -O=790.85(7.360 x 60) + (.5584 X 1000)
Since $1 equals the present value of $1 due in x years, plus
the present value of an annuity of the annual interest payments due
on $1 for x years,
IX IxL.T.S.= X (N + R)- R -- X (N+-R) -R.Py + Ix P
Under case 5 by applying the above formula L. T. S.= $240.59;
remamderman's share = $759.41 (that is, $1,000 - $240.59). By ap-
plying the Restatement rule on that portion of the carrying period
from the time the duty to sell arose, to the final realization on the
security (ten years), the life tenant is entitled to a further sum of
$216.97, making a total of $457.56.
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